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The First Amendment: A Comparison of Nineteenth
and Twentieth Century Supreme Court Interpretations
NORMAN DE JONG

Triniry Christian College
In 1791, three scant years after the Constitution of the United
States had been adopted, Congress approved and the several states
ratified ten Amendments to that Constitution. The First Amendment
read, in part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof-,
From these cryptic phrases, presumably understood and wellintentioned by all those who voted for their adoption, has come
monumental confusion. At the time this Amendment was passed, the
United States was composed of thirteen states and slightly less than
four million people. Today the U.S. population has mushroomed to
some two hundred and twenty million people spread over fifty states.
The situation to which this Amendment is supposed to apply has
changed drastically in the almost two hundred years since its adoption.
New states were carved out of the wilderness, new territories were acquired, and waves of immigrants have landed on our shores. Through
all of that change, however, the words of the First Amendment have
remained fixed and absolute. No one has waged a prolonged effort to
amend, abolish or alter it.
To be an intellectual in America during the last half of the twentieth century is tantamount to being cognizant of the church-state controversy. It seems, moreover, that the United States Supreme Court
has contributed to the confusion by interpretations since World War II
which bear little resemblence to those decisions handed down in the
first one hundred and sixty years of its existence. A comparison of
those interpretations is the subject of this paper.
In order to make any judgment as to which set of decisions is harmonious with the original intent of the framers, it is necessary to examine the context in which the Constitution and its First Amendment
were drafted.

The Constitutional Context
Without going into an exhaustive historical analysis, let me assert
that it was not the Founding Fathers' intention to attempt the impossible separation of church and state. 1 When Congress and the thirteen
states drafted the Constitution and then adopted the First Amendment, they simply and clearly stated that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."
It should be noted that Congresswas thereby prevented from
designating an established church, for that was to remain the
prerogative of the separate states. The church-state patterns which
were prevalent in Europe also found their way to America. When the
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Revolutionary War broke out in 1776, nine of the thirteen colonies had
established, state-supported churches. The Congregational church was
officially established in the New England colonies of Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Elsewhere in the colonies the
Anglican Church had become formally entrenched, with the governments of Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New York, South Carolina,
and Virginia designating the Church of England as the established
body. 2
In Virginia, the Anglican church had been established from the
earliest days of the colony. In Maryland, though, the situation differed.
Because of a rebellion involving some of the Catholic population in that
colony, the Anglican church was made the official established church
there in 1689. In Georgia and South Carolina the basic unit of colonial,
and the later state, government was the parish. All the parishes, or
congregational districts, were designated as the basic units of government, with a specified number of church members elected from each
parish to form the colonial assembly. When the Georgia state constitution was later adopted, this practice was continued with the stipulation
that "the representatives shall be of the Protestant religion. " 3
Unique among the thirteen colonies was Rhode Island, originally
named Providence Plantation. Because of the intervention of the
Puritan Commonwealth from 1642 to 1660, the people in Providence
received little attention and encouragement from England. When
Charles II was restored to the throne, however, new efforts were made
to formally recognize and establish this group of dissenters as the colony of Rhode Island. In 1663 Charles II issued a special charter in
which he designated Benedict Arnold as Governor and named 12
Assistants, one of whom was Roger Williams. 4 Recognizing that
"some of the people and inhabitants-cannot-conforme
to the publique exercise of relision, according-to the Church of England,"
Charles II stipulated that it was his royal will "that all and everye person-may freelye and fullye have and enjoye" his religious and civil
liberties to the fullest. 5
When the Continental Congress signed the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, each of the thirteen colonies became independent states. Since Virginia, South Carolina, and New Jersey had
already made their separate proclamations, Congress put out a call requesting the remaining states to draft constitutions by which they
could govern themselves.
Pennsylvania was quick to respond, with its state convention
assembled at Philadelphia on July 15, 1776. Expressing a great deal of
respect for their political traditions, the constitutional delegates closely
patterned their constitution after the charter of 1701, using almost
identical language in many of the articles. By September 28 the document was complete and ready for publication.
The Continental Congress' call for state constitutions met with a
different response in Connecticut. Instead of writing a new document,
the General Court simply appended an introductory paragraph to the
charter of 1662, in which they declared,
That the ancient Form of Civil Government, contained
in the Charter from Charles the Second, King of
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England, and adopted by the People of this State, shall
be and remain the Civil Constitution of this State. 6
When the constitutional process was concluded, a majority of the
states continued the tradition of established churches with which they
had grown up. The divisions were as follows:7
No
Yes
Until
Rhode Island
Georgia
**
New Jersey
South Carolina
1790
Pennsylvania
Virginia
1800
North Carolina
Maryland
1810
Delaware
New Hampshire
1817
New York
Connecticut
1818
Massachusetts
1833
In the European tradition , establishment of religion usually meant
that one denomination was given special, privileged status and became
the sole recipient of the state tax monies. Other religious affiliations
were labelled as dissenters and were either tolerated or declared to be
illegal. Potentially harsh treatments were well-known to many of the
colonists, causing them to incorporate into their constitutions public
statements guaranteeing religious toleration.

Qualifications for Holding Office
The newly independent states that emerged from the War of
Revolution were thoroughly and almost exclusively Protestant.
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the criteria for holding public
office. After 1776, most of the states decreed that one had to be a
member of the Protestant faith in order to be eligible for any government position. Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Carolina specified in their constitutions that all office-holders must be of "the Protestant Religion."
Pennsylvania, in spite of its reputation for toleration, ruled that each
member of the legislature, before taking his seat, shall make and
subscribe to the following declaration:
I do believe in one God, the creator and governor of
the universe, the rewarder of the good and the
punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given
by Divine inspiration. 8
It was left to Delaware, however, to draft the most concise and most
obviously Trinitarian criteria for their magistrates . Their constitution
said that,
Every person who shall be chosen a member of either
house, or appointed to any office or place of trust,
before taking his seat , or entering upon the execution
of his office, shall take the following oath, or affirmation, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to
wit:
I, AB , will bear true allegiance to the Delaware State,
submit to its constitution and laws, and do no act wit61

tingly whereby the freedom thereof may be prejudiced.
And also make and subscribe the following declaration, to wit:
I, A B, do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus
Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God,
blessed for evermore; and I do acknowledge the holy
scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given
by divine inspiration. 9

The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
In June, 1783, before the peace treaty with Britain was signed,
George Washington and Alexander Hamilton began making suggestions to Congress concerning the governance of the Northwest Territory, recently won from Britain.
The Congress which met during the summer of 1787 was materially
affected by the sessions of the Constitutional Convention. While the
process of drafting the Constitution moved ahead in Philadelphia, such
delegates as Madison and Washington maintained a keen interest in
various bills as they worked their way to the floor of Congress for final
vote. The "Ordinance for the Government of the United States, Northwest of the River Ohio" was a topic of particular interest, for
Washington had actively promoted it and Madison had served on the
committee which drafted it. Framed very closely on the model of the
Massachusetts Constitution, the law passed through second and third
readings with only minor revisions in wording. Finally, in early July,
1787, the ordinance was taken up by the full Congress.
Intended "for the prevention of crime and injuries, and for the execution of process, criminal and civil,'' 10 the law required that all of the
lands north and west of the Ohio River be surveyed and divided into
townships of 36 square miles each, with each township assuming the
basic governmental functions for the people residing in it. Article one
guaranteed religious toleration, but the most far-reaching section, and
the most often quoted, was the third article, which began,
Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged.
Ten days after Congress legislatively approved the Northwest Ordinance, the members met again to vote on enabling legislation which
would define the terms of sale, for offers of purchase had already been
received from the Ohio Company. On July 23, 1787, Congress approved
"Powers to the Board of Treasury to Contract for the Sale of Western
Territory," in which they stipulated various responsibilities and contractual obligations. Section 16 in each township was "to be given
perpetually for the purposes contained in the said ordinance," defined
there as being "religion, morality, and knowledge," the coterminous
tasks of the school. Of equal importance was the requirement that section 29 in each township must "be given perpetually for the purposes
of religion," in order that churches might be established and pastors'
salaries paid. 11
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Such was the environment in which the Constitution and its Ten
Amendments were drafted. With a variety of religious persuasions and
varying ethnic origins, the newly declared and victorious United States
formed a heterogeneous mix that would create conflicts which would
need resolution at the Supreme Court level.

Nineteenth Century Court Decisions
During the first decades of the nineteenth century , Connecticut was
aflame with controversy and hostility between "democrats" and
" federalists." The members of the Democratic-Republican party were
followers of Jefferson and Madison, while the Federalists came from
the tradition of Washington , Hamilton , and Adams. Although the
Democrats had captured the presidency in 1800 and would retain it
through the next three decades, the majority of voters in Connecticut
continued their allegiance to the Federalists.

Th e Dartmouth Case
The controversy which had swirled through the country during the early
1800's finally worked its way up to the United States Supreme Court.
What was judiciously decided in 1819, though, had its roots in the
original Connecticut Charter of 1662, which had been retained as the
" new" Constitution of 1776. From the very beginning of its statutory
existence, Connecticut had declared that its primary reason for existence was to "win and invite the Natives of the Country to the
Knowledge and Obedience of the only true GOD, and the Savior of
Mankind , and the Christian Faith. " 12
Dartmouth College was originally founded by Rev. Eleazor
Wheelock in 1751 as a means of implementing that missionary mandate . Begun as an Indian Charity School in Lebanon, Connecticut , it
was chartered by that colony's General Court and placed under its
jurisdiction. In 1763, Rev. Wheelock petitioned the Assembly for
funds to support his work and the more than twenty Indian youths who
were studying to become misssionaries to their own people. The
Assembly reacted favorably and promised to release tax funds for this
purpose , as well as to recommend the cause to all of Connecticut's
churches for their support. 13
In 1770, New Hampshire took a special interest in
Rev. Wheelock's program and enticed him to move his school to
Hanover , New Hampshire. The governor offered a 3300 acre tract of
land " freely given for the use of the college." In a letter of response
dated August 23, 1770, Rev. Wheelock promised,
I hope soon to be able to support by charity a large
Number not only of Indian youths in Moor's charity
school, which is connected and incorporated with the
College, but also of English youths in the College, in
order to their being fitted for missions among the
Indians .14
Rev. Wheelock had also received support from the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel, which was based in London, but that source
of funds was cut off by the advent of the War. In 1778, Wheelock appealed for money from Congress and was granted $925.00 for ex63

penses incurred in "supporting a number of Indian youths at his
school. " 15 For a number of years thereafter, appropriations for Dartmouth College and Rev. Wheelock's Indian mission efforts were
regularly approved by Congress.
As the War of Revolution drew to a close, the program at Dartmouth attracted increasing attention. In 1781, the question was raised
as to whether other students might enroll, but the answer was an emphatic "No," with the explanation that this school was reserved for
evangelizing Indians and for training missionaries to the Indians. With
its reputation spreading, monetary support increased. In 1789, the
government of the state of Vermont made a generous donation of
23,000 acres "of wild land," in "consideration of its contiguity to that
State." The same year the state of New Hampshire made a grant of
41,000 acres "of valuable land, adjoining the Connecticut River, near
Hanover," and followed that in 1796 with another grant of 24,500
acres.
The historic Supreme Court case, known as Dartmouth v. Woodward, had its immediate roots in a political squabble within the
Legislature of New Hampshire, which had come under the political
dominance of the Democratic-Republican Party. As part of a political
power struggle with the Federalists, the Democrats tried to wrest
control away from the existing Board of Dartmouth College and to
change its direction. The Democratic governor, with the support of the
legislature, appointed a new Board of Trustees for the college and
disbanded the existing Board. The college, in defiance of the governor,
continued to operate as a college without state funds while the case
was slowly working its way through the lower courts. Meanwhile, the
State Legislature loaned $4,000 to William Woodward, their newly appointed Treasurer of the College, to pay his legal expenses.
When the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, finally
handed down its 5-1 decision on February 2, 1819, it was clear that the
Democrats had lost and that the old Board of Trustees had won. The
Supreme Court ruled against Woodward and ordered him personally to
pay a $20,000 indemnity to the college. The original charter, which had
articulated the college's purpose of evangelizing Indians and training
missionaries, was guaranteed.
One of the clear implications of the Dartmouth decision was that
charters and contracts were to be considered inviolate. The Supreme
Court said, in effect, that the Constitution of the United States would
protect the right of a college to consider its primary purpose that of
propagating religion without interference from dissenting political or
religious factions and that it had the right to receive state tax funds for
such purposes.

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States
Based on the absence of litigation reaching the Supreme Court, it
can be assumed that the period from 1819 to 1892 was relatively tranquil on matters of church-state relationships. Surveys by various
reviewers indicate no church-state cases at the federal level between
the Dartmouth decision and that involving the Church of the Holy
Trinity, which was submitted on January 7, 1892 and decided on
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February 29 of that same year.
In response to high unemployment figures and excessive immigration pressures, Congress approved legislation on February 26, 1885
"t o prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens
under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its
Territories, and the District of Columbia." "Any person, company,
partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever," was forbidden to assist or encourage the importation or migration of any
foreigner for purposes of working in this country. The language was
broad and all-inclusive.
Holy Trinity Church, however, needed a pastor. Rev. E. Walpole
Warren, an alien residing in England, was selected as their preferred
candidate, so a contract was issued in September, 1887. Mr. Warren
accepted and moved to New York City to begin his duties. A complaint
was filed, and Holy Trinity Church was not only charged with violating
the 1885 act, but was also assessed a penalty prescribed by the act.
The facts and procedures of the case were never in question, so the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled against
the plaintiff. Holy Trinity appealed. The only question confronting the
Supreme Court, therefore, was whether the District Court had erred in
its conclusion.
The decision of the Supreme Court was unanimous and resounding. Yes, the court concluded, the acts of the church were within the
terms and conditions of the law in question. The church had clearly
violated the letter of the law, and pastors were definitely not in the
specified exemption list. But, the Court concluded, "we cannot think
Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in
the present case." "Offenses against the United States, not offenses
against the human race, were the crimes which the legislature intended
by this law to punish." Furthermore, the thoughts expressed in this act
were aimed only at the manual laboring class, and no one reading the
law "would suppose that Congress had in its mind any purpose of staying the coming into this country of ministers of the gospel."
After carefully and systematically dispensing with all the
technicalities of the litigation, the Court got to the heart of the case.
"Beyond all these matters," the opinion stated, "no purpose of action
against religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national,
because this is a religious people. This is historically true. From the
discovery of this continent to the present hour, there is a single voice
making this affirmation."
From that point to the conclusion, covering seven pages of detail
and no less than twenty-six illustrations for evidence, the Court set out
to prove "that this is a Christian nation." Quoting first from such colonial charters as those granted to Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, the Court worked its way up to the Declaration of Independence, which "recognizes the presence of the Divine in
human affairs in these words: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with Certain unalienable Rights.' 'We, therefore, the Representatives
of the United States of America, (appeal) to the SupremeJudge of the
world for the rectitude of our intentions.' (and express) 'a firm reliance
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on the Protection of Divine Providence.'"
Continuing its historical progression, the Court said, "If we examine the constitutions of the various states we find in them a constant
recognition of religious obligations. Every constitution of every one of
the forty-four states contains language which either directly or by clear
implication " insists that " the happiness of a people and the good order
and preservation of civil government essentially depend upon piety,
religion and morality. These cannot be generally diffused through a
community but by the institution of the public worship of God and of
public instructions in piety, religion and morality." To hammer home
its point, the opinion quoted sections from the state constitutions of Illinois (1809), Indiana (1816), Maryland (1867), Mississippi (1832), and
Delaware (1776).
Moving to the federal level, the Court asserted, "Even the Constitution of the United States, which is supposed to have little touch
upon the private life of the individual, contains in the First Amendment
a declaration common to the constitutions of all the States, as follows;
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'
In summing up all of the evidence to this point, the opinion went on
to declare: "There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a
universal language pervading them all, having one meaning: they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are not individual sayings, declarations of private persons: they are organic utterances; they speak the voice of the entire people. While because of a
general recognition of this truth the question has seldom been
presented to the courts, yet we find that in Updegraphv. The Commonwealth, it was decided that, 'Christianity, general Christianity, is,
and always has been a part of the common law."'
Having argued from colonial charters, the Declaration of Independence, various state constitutions, the U.S. Constitution, and
sundry court decisions , the Supreme Court turned finally to a sweeping
review of America 's laws, customs, and societal practices. Wherever
we look, they said , "we find everywhere a clear recognition of the
same truth . .. that this is a Christian nation ." In light of all that had
been so forcefully presented , the judgment of the district court was
reversed.17

SubsequentDecisions
The matter of church-state relations lay dormant for another seven
years until the case known as Bradfieldv. Roberts(175 U .S. 291) reached
the Supreme Court in 1899. In that decision, the court upheld federal
appropriations to a Catholic hospital in the District of Columbia. The
majority decided that tax monies could constitutionally be appropriated for ward construction and for the care of indigent patients,
because the hospital performed "a public service". In 1908 the Quick
Bear v. Leupp (210 U.S . 50) decision was handed down, with the Court
upholding the federal disbursement of funds , held in trust for the Sioux
Indians , to Catholic schools designated by the Sioux for payment of tuition costs. Although the monies were intended for the benefit of the Indian students , the disbursements were made directly to the Catholic
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schools for their use. In 1930 the court handed down still another decision which ruled in favor of religious establishments. In Cochranv.
LouisianaBoardof Education,the Court upheld Louisiana's purchase of
textbooks for pupils attending all schools, including private and
parochial ones. Reflecting a slight shift in public mentality, the
Supreme Court upheld the practice as constitutional on the grounds
that the benefits went to the children involved and not to the institutions as such.

Twentieth Century Turnarounds
Since World War II, the courts in the United States have interpreted the First Amendment of the Constitution in ways that bear little
resemblance to any of the decisions cited earlier. As we reflect briefly
on them, we will need to address a major concern to the matter of interpretation by the courts. We will need to ask whether the judges who
make legal pronouncements are morally and ethically bound by legal
precedent and whether they should rule on the basis of original intent
(strict construction) or whether it is permissable to interpret on the
ground of current sentiment. That, however, will be left for the reader
to decide, based on the evidence.
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
known as Eversonv. Board of Education(330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504). The
issue in the litigation was the practice of a New Jersey township
whereby they reimbursed, from tax revenues, the cost of sending
children "on regular busses operated by the public transportation
system" to and from schools, including the private and parochial
schools in that township. Everson, a municipal taxpayer, filed a formal
complaint charging that payment for Catholic parochial students'
transportation violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiff argued that the early Americans "fervently wished
to stamp out" all forms of religious establishment and "to preserve
liberty for themselves and for their posterity''.
If one read only Baptist histories or only the letters of Thomas J efferson, one could certainly arrive at such a conclusion. It should be obvious, however, in the light of all the evidence submitted in the foregoing pages, that such a selective sampling of the extant literature would
do a great disservice to the vast majority of early Americans and would
grossly distort the meaning of the First Amendment. Yet Justice Hugo
Black, writing the majority opinion in this watershed case, apparently
was influenced significantly by the plaintiff's argument and limited
himself almost exclusively to the perspective that was promulgated by
Thomas Jefferson. In the majority opinion, Justice Black detailed the
Virginia practice of paying tithes and taxes "to support government
sponsored churches whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons
designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith by
generating a burning hatred against dissenters" .18 The abhorrence of
these practices, Black argued, ''reached its dramatic climax in Virginia
in 1785-86" when "Madison wrote his great Memorial and
Remonstrance" and "when the Virginia Assembly enacted the famous
Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty." 19
Black's majority opinion argued that "the 'establishment of
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religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion
over another ... No tax in any amount, large or small can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions ... Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect a wall of separation between church and State."
Without citing precedent or case, Black went on to write, "This
Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and J efferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended
to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on
religious liberty." Apparently impervious to the historical record,
Black should have noted that Jefferson was in Europe throughout the
period in question, serving as Ambassador to France, and had no direct
involvement in drafting either the Constitution or the First Amendment.
In 1952 the Supreme Court upheld a New York City released time
program in which the religious classes were held in church buildings.
Because the religion classes were held in church buildings and not on
public school grounds, the court saw no significant danger in such practice. Yet, the Court was also quick to remind the nation that, "The
First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should
be separated (and) within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute" .20 On the heels of such a pronouncement, in a curious and inconsistent rejoinder, the Court went on to add,
"The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State ... Otherwise
... municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into
their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our
legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the
Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving a holiday;
'so help me God' in our courtroom oaths-these and all other
references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment".
In 1962, when the Court rejected the New York Board of Regents
prayer in Engel v. Vitale, it was once again Justice Hugo Black who
wrote the majority opinion. In concluding his argument, Black asserted
that a "union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion''. In making such a pronouncement, he not only
contradicted what the Constitutional framers had repeatedly said
about "religion, morality, and knowledge being essential to good
government;" he also went well beyond what Madison and
Washington had argued when they helped to formulate and enact the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Instead of following Jefferson's pattern
consistently and placing his Deism on the pedestal of prominence, the
Court, under the guidance of Justice Black, had entrenched a
philosophy of an irreligious state and secular public school system.
Since 1962 the church-state cases have become almost com-
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monplace on the Supreme Court agenda. The topics have included
Bible-reading in public schools, posting of the Ten Commandments,
use of university facilities by religious clubs, abortion, and the funding
of Christian schools. The issues and the decisions are well known to
many of us and will not be analyzed here. Suffice it to say that most of
the decisions have served to build and reinforce the "wall of separation" which was not intended or envisioned by the framers of the Constitution or the First Amendment. In the years since the Everson decision, a sacred-secular dichotomy has been imposed on the American
republic, not because the Constitution demanded it, but because a
myth was substituted for reality and was blessed by the judiciary.
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